Marjorie Ann Brown, Plaintiff/ Appellant, v. The Estate of Alice Nelson, Defendant/ Appellee. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
Marjorie Ann Brown, Plaintiff/ Appellant, v. The Estate of Alice 
Nelson, Defendant/ Appellee. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, Brown v Estate of Nelson, No. 20150412 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3140 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARJORIE ANN BROWN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
THE ESTATE OF ALICE NELSON, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
AppelJate Case No: 20150412-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE ERNEST JONES 
J Bradford DeBry, #7708 
ROBERY J DEBRY & ASSOC. 
4253 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
T: (801) 262-8915 
F: (801) 262-8995 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Marjorie Ann Brown 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
David E . Brown; #13155 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
T: (801) 562-5555 
F: (801) 562-5510 
rkg(a),smithglauser.com 
deb@smithglauser.com 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee The 
Estale of Alice Nelson 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY - 9 2016 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARJORIE ANN BROWN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
THE ESTATE OF ALICE NELSON, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Appellate Case No: 20150412-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE ERNEST JONES 
J Bradford DeBry, #7708 
ROBERY J DEBRY & ASSOC. 
4253 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
T: (801) 262-8915 
F: (801) 262-8995 
Attorneys for P laintiffl Appellant 
Marjorie Ann Brown 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
David E. Brown, # 13155 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
T: (801) 562-5555 
F: (801)562-5510 
rkg@smithglauser.com 
deb@smithglauser.com 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee The 
Estate of Alice Nelson 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................... l 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED .......................................................................... 1 
Standard of Review .............................................................................................................. I 
Deter1ninative At1thority ...................................................................................................... I 
Preservation .......................................................................................................................... I @ 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES ......................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 6 
I. Under Utah Law, Appellant's Recovery Is Limited By Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act' S Exclusivity provision ..................................................................... 6 
A. The Purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not Only to Compensate ® 
Injured Employees, but Also to Protect Employers and Co-Employees, such as Alice 
Nelson, from Co-Employee Tort Claims ...................................................................... 6 
B. Pursuant to the Act, an Employee is Acting Within the Course of Her 
Employment While Walking in an Employee Parking Lot Headed into Work ............ 9 
C. The District Court Correctly Held that Appellant's Remedies for Her Alleged 
Injuries are Limited to Worker's Compensation ......................................................... 12 
II. Appellant Cannot Plead Around the Act's Exclusivity Clause By Bringing an 
Action in District Court .................................................................................................. 14 
A. Appellant Collected Workers' Compensation Benefits, and is Limited to Those 
Benefits made Available to Her Under the Act, Provided Appellant Cooperated with 
the Workers' Compensation Investigation .................................................................. 14 
B. The Court is Bound by the Precedent Set Forth in Soldier Creek, Which was 
Previously Applied in Hope . ..... _. ................................................................................. 16 
C. Appellant's Hypotheticals are Answered by the Standard Set Forth in Hope and 
Soldier Creek ............................................................................................................... 25 
~ III. There are No Material Factual Disputes Precluding Summary Judgment. .......... 27 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 29 
Addendu1n .......................................................................................................................... 31 
@ 
II 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P .3d 315 ......................................... 18, 23 
Bennett v. Industrial Comm 'n, 726 P.2d 427, (Utah 1986) ................................................. 8 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) ............................... 21, 22, 23, 25 
Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) ............................................................... 23 
Doctor's Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Clark, 498 So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 1986) ................................ 11 
Drake v. lndust. Com 'n of Utah, 904 P.2d 203 (Utah App. 1995) .......................... 9, 16, 27 
Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Jns. Co. v. JC. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 743 (N.M. 1987) .............. 11 
Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33,232 P.3d 1059 .............................................. 7, 19 
Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 23, 
25,26,27,28 
Hunsaker v. State 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993) ....................................................................... 7 
King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovsky, 524 A.2d 1245 (Md. App. 1987) .............................. l 1 
Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989) ........................................ 12 
MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 116 P.3d 56 (Nev. 2005) .................................... 11 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Robertson, 35 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2001) ................................ 11 
Murray v. Utah Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33,271 P.3d 192 .......................... 9, 16 
Murray v. Utah Labor Commission, 2013 UT 38,308 P.3d 461 ...................................... 16 
Pitkin v. Western Constr., 733 P.2d 727 (Idaho 1987) ...................................................... 11 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 4, 153 P .3d 179 ....................... 18, 19 
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, 16 P.3d 555 ........................ 7, 8, 9, 19, 20 
111 
~ 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155,493 P.2d 994,995 (Utah 1972) ..................... 8 
Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) ... 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 21, 23, 
25,26,27,28 
Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26,232 P.3d 514 ................................................................ 14 
State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) ......................... 9, 16 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77,985 P.2d 243 ..... 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 22 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-l 05 .................................................................................. 1, 2, 5, 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8A-4- l 03 .............................................................................................. 1 
@ Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-l 0 1 ............................................................................................ 6 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah @) 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)O). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Under Utah precedent, if an individual is injured in her employer's parking lot 
while on her way into work, she is deemed to be in the course of her employment. Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained "in the 
course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment." Utah Code Ann.§ 
34A-2-105(1). Accordingly, did the trial court correctly hold that Appellant's claims 
against her co-employee, Alice Nelson, were barred by exclusive remedy provision of 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act for injuries Appellant sustained when her co-
employee hit her in their employer's parking lot on while on their way into work? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, giving no deference to the District Com1's rulings on the issues. See Utah 
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 8, 985 P.2d 243. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-l 05 
Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) 
PRESERVATION 
This issue was preserved in the District Court's Order granting Appellee's 
Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 372-75.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) 
(I) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against 
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the 
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, 
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at 
law may not be maintained against an employer or against any officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee .... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident between co-employees in 
Ci an employee parking lot. Specifically, Appellant, Mar:jorie Brown, was hit by her co-
employee, Alice Nelson, while in their employee parking lot headed into their office 
building. 
As a result of this accident, and despite Utah's Workers' Compensation Act 
barring Appellant from filing negligence claims against her co-employee for injuries 
sustained on their employer's premises, Appellant filed a third-party negligence case 
against Ms. Nelson, who is now deceased. 
Based on the restrictions in Utah's Workers' Compensation Act, and the virtually 
factually identical precedent set forth by this Court in Hope v. Berrett, 756 P .2d I 02 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Ms. Nelson's estate filed a Summary Judgment Motion seeking 
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dismissal of Appellant's inappropriately filed "third-party" negligence claim against Ms. 
Nelson. 
Under the clear precedent and sound reasoning set forth in Hope, the District 
Court granted the Summary Judgment Motion and dismissed Appellant's negligence 
claims filed against her co-worker. Appellant appeals the District Court's decision, @ 
requesting that this Court replace the well-established, liberal standards of detennining 
"employees" in Workers' Compensation cases with the stricter, unrelated "employee" 
standard applied in third-party vicarious liability cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Parties, Employment, and IRS Facilities: 
On January 30, 2012, Appellant Marjorie Brown was employed by the Internal 
Revenue Service, located at 1973 North Rulon Whit Boulevard, Ogden, Utah ("the IRS 
Building"). (R. 101-02.) Ms. Brown had been employed by the IRS since 2007. (R. ~ 
101.) On that same date, Appellee, Alice Nelson, who is now deceased, was also 
employed by the IRS and worked at the IRS Building. (R. I 03.) 
The IRS Building had an adjoining parking lot designated for IRS employees ("the 
Employee Parking Lot"), including Ms. Brown and Ms. Nelson. (R. 102.) The 
Employee Parking Lot was surrounded by a single-entrance fence. (R. I 02; see also 
photographs of the IRS Building and adjoining fenced Employee Parking Lot (R. 145-
47 .).) The only way to enter the IRS Building is to first enter the fenced-in Employee 
Parking Lot. (See id.) 
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In order to enter the Employee Parking Lot, individuals were required to present a 
current employee badge to get past a guard. (R. 102.) The Employee Parking Lot was 
patrolled by guards and German Shepherds, and Employees were not pennitted to bring 
weapons into the Employee Parking Lot. (R. 122, p. 23 I. 18 - p. 24 I. 9.) Employee's 
also used the Employee Parking Lot for fire drills that required evacuating the IRS 
Building. (R. 122, p. 2111. 10-15.) 
As testified by Appellant during her deposition, and illustrated in photographs of 
the IRS Building showing the Employee Parking Lot and the surrounding, guarded fence, 
the Employee Parking Lot and the IRS Building were both used by IRS employees in 
@ conjunction with their employment. (R. 102, 121-24, and 145-47.) 
The Accident: 
On January 30, 2012, Appellant entered the Employee Parking Lot in her van, on 
her way into work. (R. 102.) After parking her van, Appellant was walking in the 
Employee Parking Lot on her way into the IRS Building for work when she was involved 
in an automobile/pedestrian accident with the now deceased Ms. Nelson ("the 
Accident"). (R. 101-03.) 
As a result of the Accident, the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 
~ Department of Treasury holds a lien for amounts paid for this on-the-job injury. A fact 
undisputed by Ms. Brown at the trial com1. (R. 248.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's well-established Workers' Compensation Act, an employee who is 
injured by a co-employee on their employer~s premises may not file a third-party 
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negligence claim against her co-employee. This principle is made abundantly clear in 
Utah's statutes and controlling case law. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) 
(2008); Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Soldier Creek Coal Co. 
v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, Appellant, Marjorie Brown, and her co-employee, Alice Nelson, were 
involved in an automobile/pedestrian accident in their employer's parking lot, while they 
were both headed into their employer's building to begin their workday. As set forth in 
Hope, a case that is virtually identical to this case, an accident that occurs on an 
employer's premises between coworkers, cannot give rise to a third-party claim between 
the coworkers. Appellant ignored the Workers' Compensation exclusive remedy 
provision, as well as the legal precedent set forth in Soldier Creek, and Hope, and filed a 
third-party negligence claim against her Ms. Nelson, her co-worker. In light of the clear 
and controlling authority, the District Court appropriately dismissed Appellant's third-
party suit against her co-employee, Alice Nelson. 
Appellant recognizes the mirrored facts between this case and Hope, and therefore 
Appellant argues that Hope has been ( or otherwise should be) overruled, and replaced 
with the more strict standard of detennining employee status used in non-employee, 
third-party vicarious liability cases. However, such an application would not only be 
unprecedented, it would abolish the intent and policy behind Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Jaws. Appe11ant's application would improperly permit injured employees 
to avoid the exclusive remedy provision provided as a protection for employers and co:.. 
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employees against such actions. This Court should not accept Appellant's invitation to 
Gi pioneer a new, stricter, and destructive standard to Workers' Compensation cases. 
Lastly, Appellant's claim that factual issues exist are untrue. The clear, 
undisputed facts of this case show that Appellant and Alice Nelson were coworkers, that 
they were involved in an accident in an employee parking lot while headed into work. 
Under these undisputed facts, as applied in Hope, no material factual disputes existed that 
would preclude summary judgment. 
For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, the District Court appropriately 
granted summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's claims against her co-employee, 
@ Alice Nelson, for injuries that occurred on their employer's premises. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH LAW, APPELLANT'S RECOVERY IS LIMITED BY 
UTAH'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT'S EXCLUSIVITY 
PROVISION. 
A. The Purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not Only to 
Compensate Injured Employees, but Also to Protect Employers and 
Co-Employees, such as Alice Nelson, from Co-Employee Tort Claims. 
Utah has adopted a Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") to govern injuries 
sustained under certain conditions by employees. See Utah Code Ann. § § 34A-2-101 et 
@ seq. Specifically, the Act states, in relevant pat1: 
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against 
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
~ employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the 
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, 
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heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or ~ 
because of or arising out of tlte employee's employment, and an action at 
law may not be maintained against an employer or against any officer, 
agent, or employee of tlte employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee . ... 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (2008) (emphasis added). As set forth in the Act, when @ 
an employee is injured by a co-worker "in the course of or because of or arising out of 
the employee's employment," the injured employee "may not" file a lawsuit against her 
employer or co-worker, and all civil liability is replaced by the remedies provided by the 
Act. See id. ( emphasis added). 
This Act "represents a compromise between employee and employer under which 
an injured employee receives a simple and speedy procedure which eliminates the 
expense, delay and uncertainty in proving fault, while the employer is granted immunity 
from suit by the employee." Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, 1 28, 232 P.3d ~ 
1059. This compromise grants co-employees the same immunity from suit as their 
employer. See id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105( I) . This compromise was 
further explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp.: 
The workers' compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo 
between employers and employees. See Hunsaker v. State 870 P.2d 893, 
899 (Utah 1993 ). Under the Act's balancing of rights, "employees are able 
to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault ... and employers 
are protected from tort suits by employees," id., by virtue of the Act's 
exclusive remedy provision .... 
Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, 1 19, 16 P.3d 555. The Act also precludes an injured 
employee from ~"masquerading" her claims as something other than a Workers~ 
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Compensation tort claim, in an attempt to avoid the exclusive remedy of the Act and 
@ bring a third-party action against an employer and/or co-employee. Id. at ,r 20. 
Furthermore, the Act is to be liberally construed in favor of holding that the 
injured employee is limited to Workers' Compensation benefits, including incidents 
which would bar an injured employee from suing another employee. See Utah Home 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 18, 985 P .2d 243. Utah recognizes the: 
[L]ong-standing policy that the Workers' Compensation Act should be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. See, e.g., Smith v. Alfred 
Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994, 995 (1972). In line with that 
policy, we have stated that it is "proper to resolve doubt as to whether a 
worker was an employee in favor of [the worker being an] employee." 
Bennett [v. Industrial Comm 'n], 726 P.2d [427,] 430 [(Utah 1986)]. It 
would indeed be inconsistent to resolve doubts in favor of a worker being 
considered an employee when the worker is seeking coverage but not in 
other situations, such as here, where the worker is being sued by another 
employee. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
The Act and interpreting case law have established clear standards regarding the 
application of the Act, and Appellant concedes that an employee who is injured by 
ti> another employee "in the course of employment" is limited to the Act's remedies. 
Equally clear under binding case law is the Act's underlying policy, i.e., to protect not 
just an injured employee, but also a negligent employer and negligent co-employees from 
liability in a third-party action. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2- l 05( 1) (2008); 
Gudmundson, 2010 UT 33, ,r 28,232 P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ,r 19, 16 
P.3d 555; and Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 18, 985 P.2d 243. 
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B. Pursuant to the Act, an Employee is Acting Within the Course of Her 
Employment While Walking in an Employee Parking Lot Headed into 
Work. 
Utah appellate courts have been called upon numerous times to interpret the 
meaning of "in the course of ... employment" as that statement applies to employees 
seeking (or attempting to avoid) the Act. See, e.g., Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P .2d 1165 (Utah 1985); Murray v. 
Utah Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33, 271 P.3d 192; Drake v. Indus!. Com 'n of 
Utah, 904 P.2d 203 (Utah App. 1995); State Tax Comm 'n v. Industrial Comm 'n, 685 P.2d 
1051 (Utah 1984); Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243; and Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 
94, 16 P.3d 555. In fact, this Court has specifically been asked to opine on whether an 
individual who was injured by a coworker in an employee parking lot on her way into 
work was in the course of her employment at the time of the accident, therefore limiting 
her remedies to those provided by the Act. See Hope, 756 P.2d. 
The Hope case is squarely on point and dispositive of Appellant's claims. In 
Hope, this Court was asked to consider whether an accident that took place in an 
employee parking lot prior to the beginning of the working day was in the "course of 
[employees'] employment." Id. at 103. There, as here, "the parties were both civilian 
employees of the United States Government." Id. at 102. The plaintiff was "walking 
from the parking lot to her place of employment." Id. The "plaintiff was struck by 
defendant's privately owned vehicle" while the plaintiff was walking in the parking lot, 
and prior to reporting to her workstation. Id. Likewise, the ""[d]efendant had just arrived 
at [vmrk] and was preparing to park prior to beginning his working day.~· Id. Following 
9 
@ 
that accident, the plaintiff "filed a complaint against defendant in state court alleging her 
injuries resulted from the negligent and careless manner in which he operated his 
vehicle." Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs action against the defendant, her 
coworker. Id. The district court held that the Act precluded seeking damages against the 
defendant, because Workers' Compensation benefits were "the exclusive remedy in this 
case, the accident having occurred on the employer's premises, even though the 
employee had not yet arrived at her workstation." Id. at 102-03. 
This Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action on the basis that the 
accident occurred "in the 'course of [the plaintiffs] employment,"' even though the 
plaintiff had not yet arrived at her workstation. Id. at 103. This Court noted that: 
Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of . 
. . employment." However, there are two exceptions to this going-to-and-
from-work rule. Under the first exception, the accident is covered if it 
occurs on the employer's premises, even if the employee has not yet arrived 
at his work site or has already left the work site. 
Id. (quoting Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985). This 
Court further stated: "The employer's property line provides a bright line test for 
application of the premises rule, based on the logic that while the employee is on the 
employer's premises, his connection with employment is both 'physical and tangible."' 
@ Id. ( quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P .2d at 1166). As a result, this Court held: "In view of 
these clear dictates, we conclude that both parties were in the scope and course of their 
employment when the accident occurred," affirming the District Court's dismissal of the 
@ third-party action against the defendant. Id. 
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The application of this "parking lot rule," or also more broadly known as the 
"premises rule," is not unique to Utah law. An overwhelming majority of states have 
adopted this same rule as a "bright line test for," see id. (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d 
at 1166), determining whether an accident occurred in the course of employment, thereby 
placing the injury under the purview of the states' respective Workers' Compensation @ 
statutes.1 The application of the premises rule in Hope and Soldier Creek is a well-
established, and overwhelmingly supported position. 
1 Recognition of this parking lot/premises rule is not unique to Utah. See, e.g., 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Robertson, 35 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2001), the Supreme Court of 
Alaska applied the premises rule to an employee's claims after that employee was injured 
while crossing a public street from a parking lot, which the employee paid to park at a 
"discounted rate," even though the injury occurred on a street that was not part of the 
employer's premises. Id. at 13. The court held that the employee's injury was covered 
by Worker's Compensation, which conclusion was "supported by a well-recognized 
application of the 'premises rule."' Id. at 13-14. The court further pointed out that the 
premises rule is applied by "courts of most states." Id. at 14; Doctor's Bus. Serv., Inc. v. 
Clark, 498 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1986) (holding that an employee was entitled to 
compensation for injuries sustained on public sidewalk while coming from employer's 
parking lot to employer's office building during lunch hour); Pitkin v. Western Constr., 
733 P.2d 727, 728 (Idaho 1987) (recognizing that exceptions to the coming-and-going 
rule include "incidents where the employee is on the employer's premises in the vicinity 
of the actual situs of his employment"); King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovsky, 524 A.2d 
1245, 1248 (Md. App. 1987) (stating: "Ordinarily, injuries sustained by an employee 
while 'going or coming' from his or her place of employment are not compensable under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act because they do not arise out of and in the course of 
employment. Two exceptions to this general rule are the 'premises rule' and the 
'proximity rule.' The former 'applies when an employee is injured on the premises of the 
employer and while going to or from his or her job."' (internal citations omitted)); MGM 
Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400, 116 P.3d 56 (Nev. 2005) (holding that the 
employee was covered by Worker's Compensation benefits as she "was on the 
employer's premises as she walked from the employer's parking lot to the employer's 
sidewalk entrance about ten minutes before she was scheduled to work [when s]he 
tripped over the curb, part of the workplace environment, and injured her ankle."); 
Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. JC. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 743 (N.M. 1987) (adopting 
the premises rule to apply to an employee who was injured after she tripped on a 
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C. The District Court Correctly Held that Appellant's Remedies for Her 
Alleged Injuries are Limited to Worker's Compensation. 
In applying the premises rule in Hope, the District Court properly dismissed 
Appellant's district court action against her co-worker, Ms. Nelson. As explained above, 
@ Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) prohibits Appellant from filing suit against any co-
employee if her claimed injuries occurred in the course of her employment, which has 
specifically been held by this Court to include any injuries sustained by an employee 
injured by a coworker while on her way into her office building. See Hope, 756 P.2d 
102. 
The District Court in this current matter compared the virtually identical, and 
undisputed, facts of Appellant's case to Hope. Namely, Appellant and Ms. Nelson were 
involved in an automobile/pedestrian accident; they were both government employees; 
the accident took place in their Employee Parking Lot; Appellant was headed in to work 
at the time of the Accident; likewise, Ms. Nelson had not yet began her workday; Ms. 
Nelson was operating a privately owned vehicle; and neither party had yet reported to 
@ their workstation. See Hope, 756 P.2d at 102-03 (holding that Worker's Compensation 
was the plaintiffs exclusive remedy for her injuries since at the time of the accident the 
,i) sprinkler on her way to the employee parking lot after she had clocked out of work for 
the day); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 148 & 150 (Tenn. 1989) 
(noting that "nearly all jurisdictions" apply the premises rule, and "the great majority of 
jurisdictions consider parking lots owned or maintained by the employer for employees to 
be part of the premises." Further holding that ··a worker who is on the employer's 
premises coming to or going from the actual work place is acting in the course of 
@ employment;· and "that if the employer has provided a parking area for its employees, 
that parking area is part of the employer's premises regardless of whether the lot is also 
available to customers or the general public.'"). 
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parties were co-workers, the plaintiff was in their employee parking lot, the plaintiff was 
walking into her place of employment, the plaintiff was struck by a coworker's private 
vehicle, the defendant was also just beginning his workday, and neither party had 
reported to their workstation). By removing the names, the facts of this case and Hope 
are interchangeable. 
Based on these undisputed facts, the District Court appropriately held the 
following: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
(R. 373-74.) 
The case of Hope v. Berrett, 7 56 P .2d 102 (Ut. App. 1988) is 
controlling law. Additionally, the Hope case is factually similar in 
all material respects to the facts of the instant case. 
Applying the "premises rule" as stated in Hope, both plaintiff and 
defendant were on the employer's premises and in the course of their 
employment when this accident occurred. 
Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury which was caused by a co-
worker on the employer's parking lot which was designated for 
employees to park. 
Plaintiff is only entitled to pursue a workers' compensation claim 
pursuant to Utah statutes. 
Plaintiff cannot maintain a personal injury lawsuit against her co-
employee, defendant Nelson. 
Because the District Court appropriately followed the legal precedent set by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek, and applied again by this Court in Hope-which is 
the overwhelming majority opinion across the country-this Court should affirm the 
District Court's holding. 
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II. APPELLANT CANNOT PLEAD AROUND THE ACT'S EXCLUSIVITY 
CLAUSE BY BRINGING AN ACTION IN DISTRICT COURT. 
A. Appellant Collected Workers' Compensation Benefits, and is Limited 
to Those Benefits made Available to Her Under the Act, Provided 
Appellant Cooperated with the Workers' Compensation Investigation. 
First, it was undisputed in the District Court that Plaintiff collected some Workers' 
Compensation benefits from the Accident. (See R. 248.) "By definition, if an employee 
is collecting workers' compensation benefits under the Act, his injury occurred within the 
course of his employment because that is a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits." 
Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26, ~ 16,232 P.3d 514. 
Appellee anticipates that Appellant may attempt to downplay this undisputed fact 
by expanding on her one-sentence conclusory statement-which was made without 
providing any citation of factual support-from her Summary Judgment Opposition 
i) Memorandum, that: "Plaintiffs Workers' Compensation benefits were denied precisely 
because the subject accident did not occur on her employer's premises and because 
Defendant and Plaintiff both were not in the course and scope of their employment." (R. 
@ 189.) However, contrary to Appellant's factually incorrect and unsupported assertion, the 
Office of Workers' Comp Programs sent a letter on June 8, 2012 to Appellant as a 
follow-up to its March 1, 2012 letter informing her of deficiencies in her claim and giving 
her thirty (30) days to address those deficiencies. (See Addendum A, p. 1.)2 In the June 
2012 letter, Appellant was informed that she "'failed to respond to the questions regarding 
2 While this document was not included as part of the Appellate Record, it is the only 
@ evidence showing the basis for Appellant's Workers' Compensation benefits withdrawal; 
Appellant cited no evidence to support her conclusory, and factually untrue, statement 
regarding the withdrawal of Workers' Compensation benefits. 
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the location of your injury, whether you were on agency premises, and specifically what 
activity was being performed at the time. Therefore, there is insufficient information on 
record to determine whether you were in the performance of duty." (See Addendum A, 
p.2 ( emphasis added).) Appellant was specifically informed in that two-page letter that: 
Under the PECA, an injury sustained by a plant employee, having fixed 
hours and place of work, while going to or coming from work is generally 
not compensable because it does not occur in the performance of duty. 
However, exceptions to this rule have been declared and one suclt 
exception is the premises rule: an employee driving to and from work is 
covered under workers' [sic] Compensation wltile on the premises of the 
employer. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Office of Workers' Comp further informed Appellant that: 
"The premises doctrine is applied where it is affirmatively shown that the employer 
owned, maintained, or controlled the parking facility, used the facility with the owner's 
special permission, or provided parking for its employees." Id. (emphasis added). The 
Office of Workers' Comp provided Appellant with the direction on how to appeal its (j 
decision to withdraw benefits based solely on Appellant's failure to provide sufficient 
information. Despite Appellant being given a clear direction and opportunity to provide 
the additional information that would have shown that the Accident occurred in the 
parking lot "provided for the IRS employees," thereby continuing the previously obtained 
Workers' Compensation benefits, Appellant elected not to provide the requisite 
infonnation to the Office of Workers' Comp. See id. Instead, Appellant improperly 
chose to abandon her Workers' Compensation claim and file a civil action against her 
coworker, Ms. Nelson. Appellant cannot, by failing to cooperate in a Workers' 
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Compensation claim, somehow transfonn her claim into one that did not arise on the 
@ employer's premises. 
Regardless, even if Appellant had not received any Workers' Compensation 
benefits for this Accident, and the Court elects to not consider the Office of Workers' 
Comp letter sent to Appellant, the undisputed facts in this case still prevent Appellant 
from filing a civil suit against Ms. Nelson. See Section I, supra. 
B. The Court is Bound by the Precedent Set Forth in Soldier Creek, 
Which was Previously Applied in Hope. 
1. In Determining Whether Appellant and Ms. Nelson Were Co-
Employees at the Time of the Accident, this Court Should Apply 
the Liberal Workers' Compensation Rulings and Purposes, and 
Not the Strict Standards Used in Non-Workers' Compensation 
Negligence Settings. 
In detennining whether an employee was in the course of employment at the time 
of an accident, the employee status tests are applied liberally, with the facts resolved in 
favor of applying coverage under the Act. See Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ,r 6, 271 P.3d 
192 ("The Act is to be construed liberally, resolving any doubt as to an employee's right 
(i to compensation in favor of the employee.~~) (aff d by Murray v. Utah Labor 
Commission, 2013 UT 3 8, 308 P .3d 461 ); see also Drake, 904 P .2d at 207 ("[T]he Act 
should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage." (quoting State Tax 
Comm 'n, 685 P.2d at 1053)). In addition, as discussed above: 
The Workers' Compensation Act is intended not only to compensate 
employees for job-related injuries~ but also to protect them against liability 
for job-related conduct. The exclusive remedy provision of the Act makes 
this latter purpose clear: 
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The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions 
of this title for injuries sustained by an employee ... shall be 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee 
of the employer . . . and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of 
an employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988) (emphasis added). The protection 
against suit provided by this section extends to any employee .... 
Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 21, 985 P.2d 243 (alterations and citations in original). 
In Manning, a temporary construction employee of Holmes & Narver, Manning, ®l 
was injured when scaffolding he was standing on collapsed. Id. at ,r 3. Manning 
collected Workers' Compensation benefits from Holmes & Narver, and then filed suit 
against Green, a former Holmes & Narver subcontractor. Id. at ,r,r 2-5. Manning argued 
that since Green was an independent contractor, he was not a coworker, and Manning had 
an independent third-party cause of action against Green. Id. at ,r 6. The propriety of a 
negligence action against Green centered on whether he was considered an "employee" 
under the Act. The district court held that "for purposes of the Workers' Compensation 
Act, Green was an employee of Holmes & Narver and was therefore immune from 
Manning's suit under the exclusive remedy provision." Id. at ,r 7. In that third-party 
lawsuit, the Utah Supreme Court turned to the definitions provided in the Act, as well as 
case law interpreting who constitutes an "employee" under the Act. Id. at ,r,r 9-11. In ~ 
applying the Workers' Compensation standard, the Supreme Court held that Green 
qualified has an employee under the Act, regardless of the "intended relationship~~ 
between Green and Holmes & Narver. Id. at ,r,r IO & 13. The Supreme Court stated: 
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We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling as 
a matter of law that Green was an employee of Holmes & Narver for 
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act .... 
As an employee under the Workers' Compensation Act, Green is 
entitled to the protections the Act affords, including the protection against 
suit for injuries sustained by other employees of Holmes & Narver. 
Id. at ,r,I 18-19. 
The Utah Supreme Court has directly acknowledged the contrast between liberal 
Workers' Compensation standard and the stricter standard applied in third-party 
negligence cases: 
We break no new ground by applying different standards of review 
to scope-of-employment cases derived from vicarious liability and workers' 
compensation cases. In Ahlstrom, we anticipated the arrival of this appeal 
when we stated that 
[w]ith very different presumptions governing worker's 
compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to 
hold that the rules governing scope of employment questions 
in one area are wholly applicable to the other because the 
legal effect of identical facts may be different in a negligence 
case than in a worker's compensation case. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 4, ,r 18, 153 P.3d 179 (quoting 
Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, ,r 7, 73 P.3d 315). Understanding the 
underlying policy differences between accidents governed by Workers' Compensation 
@ and third-party negligence actions in which an injured non-employee attempts to bring an 
action against a tort-feasor's employer under respondeat superior, the Utah Supreme 
Court explained that "the application of the going and coming rule to a single event may 
@ result in treating a person as an employee for the purpose of establishing eligibility for 
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workers' compensation benefits while withholding employee status for the purpose of 
making the employer liable to third persons." Id. at ,r 4. 
To prevent injured employees from attempting to plead around the Act's 
exclusivity provision, this Court must follow the lead set by the Utah Supreme Court by 
examining Workers' Compensation rulings under the Act's liberal standards and 
analyses, and ignoring those in non-Workers' Compensation cases. See, e.g., Id. 
As illustrated by the reasoning in Salt Lake City Corp., failing to apply the Act's 
liberal course of employment standard to a determination of whether the Act applies to a 
given set of facts, regardless of the forum in which the claim is brought, defeats the intent 
and policies created by the Workers' Compensation System. More specifically, an 
individual who would be considered an employee under the liberal standard applied to 
Workers' Compensation cases, but not an employee under the stricter third-party 
® 
v1canous liability cases, could avoid the Act's exclusivity provision by filing a ~ 
negligence claim instead of a Workers' Compensation claim. See id. Allowing such a 
strategic action by an employee in an attempt to avoid employee status for her injuries, 
would destroy the mutually beneficial intent of the Act by allowing an employee to 
subject a coworker to a negligence action that the coworker should have been protected 
from under the Act. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-l 05( 1) (2008); Gudmundson, 
2010 UT 33, ii 28,232 P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ,r 19, 16 P.3d 555; and 
Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 18, 985 P.2d 243. 
This case is not the first time a party has attempted to '"plead around the workers' 
compensation exclusivity provision.'~ See, e.g.~ Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ,i 18, 16 
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P.3d 555. In Shattuck-Owen, an employee attempted to plead a third-party cause of 
@ action against her employer for injuries she sustained by framing her claim as "one for 
breach of contract," which would not be excluded under the Act. Id. at 11 18 & 21. 
Recognizing the plaintiffs attempt to plead around the exclusivity provision of the Act, 
(j 
The Utah Supreme Court "prevent[ ed the] employee[] from evading the recovery 
restrictions of the Act" by reasoning that "the exclusive remedy provision extends far 
enough to bar what are essentially tort claims masquerading as breach of contract 
claims." Id. at ,I 20. 
Even though Appellant has not attempted to masquerade her claims as something 
@ other than a tort claim, Shattuck-Owen illustrates the need for the Court to prevent 
Appellant from "evading the recovery restrictions of the Act" by attempting to frame this 
action as a "third-party negligence" case. Utah precedent, along with well-established 
policy underlying the Act, requires the Court to disregard Appellant's request to take a 
novel approach and overrule legal precedent by applying a stricter course of employment 
standard to this Workers' Compensation issue. As such, as explained in Section I, supra, 
this Court should analyze the undisputed facts of this case under the appropriate 
Workers' Compensation standard and hold, as it did in Hope, that Appellant was within 
~ the course of her employment at the time of the Accident. The bottom line is that this 
case involves an employee attempting to sue her co-employee. It does not involve a non-
employee attempting to hold a tort-feasor's employer liable for negligent acts. 
@ 
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2. The Cases Relied upon by Appellant to Argue a More Narrow 
Approach to Determining the Employee Statuses of Appellant 
and Ms. Nelson are Limited to Respondeat Superior Claims, and 
are not Applicable for Determining the Applicability of the Act's 
Exclusivity Provision. 
Appellant argues that a string of cases following Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 
P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), have "sub silentio" overruled Hope and, by necessity, Soldier 
Creek. (See App. Brief, p. 13, subsection I.f.) However, the cases cited by Appellant do 
not support this conclusion. 
First, Appellant points to Birkner in an attempt to skirt around both the liberal 
application and exclusivity clause of the Act, and ultimately narrow the analysis used to 
evaluate the employment statuses of Appellant and Ms. Nelson. However, Birkner does 
not support a departure from the well-established rules in Soldier Creek and Hope. In 
Birkner, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to answer whether an employer, Salt Lake 
County, could be vicariously liable for sexual misconduct perfonned by its employee, 
Mr. Flowers, against the non-employee plaintiff, Ms. Birkner. Birkner, 771 P .2d at 1055-
56. Ms. Birkner, was not employed by Salt Lake County; Mr. Flowers was no a co-
employer of the claimant. As such, any claims brought by the injured party, Ms. Birkner, 
would have no application to the Workers' Compensation Act. When Ms. Birkner filed a 
lawsuit against Mr. Flowers' employer, Salt Lake County, under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether 
the actions of Salt Lake County could be vicariously liable for the acts of Mr. Flowers 
based on whether Mr. Flowers exceeded the scope of his employment. Specifically, the 
Birkner Com1 explained that in order for an employer to be liable to a third-party for the 
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acts of its employee, the employee's acts must: (I) "be of the general kind the employee 
@ is employed to perform," (2) "must occur within the hours of the employee's work and 
the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment," and (3) must be motivated, at least in 
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest." Id. at 1056-57. 
The purpose of this three-part test is to protect an employer from liability owed to 
a non-employee third-party, for the independent acts of a rogue employee. See id. at 
1057 (stating "If the employee acts 'from purely personal motives ... in no way 
connected with the employers' interests' or if the conduct is 'unprovoked, highly unusual, 
and quite outrageous,' then the master is not liable." ( quoting Prosser and Keeton on the 
@ Law of Torts§ 70 at 506 (5th ed. 1984))). 
Appellant admits that this three-part Birkner test is, as explained above, more 
restrictive than the standard applied under the Act-which serves to provide no-fault 
coverage for an injured employee, while protecting the employer and other employees 
from liability for those injuries. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1 ); 
Gudmundson, 2010 UT 33, ~ 28, 232 P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ~ 19, 16 
P.3d 555; Manning, 1999 UT 77, ~ 18, 985 P.2d 243; and Hope, 756 P.2d at 103. 
Expanding the use of the Birkner test beyond respondeat superior cases to Workers' 
@ Compensation cases would be an unprecedented step, ignore the intent of the Act, and as 
more fully explained above, effectively allow an injured party to choose which "'course of 
employment" standard to apply based on where that injured party decided to pursue her 
@ claim. 
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Appellant cites three other cases, which she alleges follows the footsteps of 
Birkner and overrules Hope and therefore Solder Creek: Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1991); Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315; and Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 
4, 153 P.3d 179. Again, none of these cases support Appellant's attempt to abandon 
Hope. 
In light of the discussion on Birkner above, Clover and Ahlstrom require little 
discussion. As with Birkner, both Clover and Ahlstrom are cases in which non-
employees attempted to hold employers vicariously liable for the acts of their employees. 
In both of these cases, there was no possibility that Workers' Compensation benefits 
would be available to the injured parties, as the injured parties were not employed by the 
named employers, and were not co-workers of the alleged negligent employees. See 
Clover, 808 P.2d at 1038-40; Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, ,r,r 1-6, 73 P.3d 315. As such, neither 
of these cases have any application to the matter before this Court, i.e., whether Q) 
Appellant's legal remedies are limited to Workers' Compensation benefits. 
By contrast, Salt Lake City Corp. did involve a Worker's Compensation issue and 
clearly highlights the different standards used in a Workers' Compensation case. In Salt 
Lake City Corp., the Utah Supreme Court addressed the same accident involved in 
Ahlstrom; however, the claimant in Salt Lake City Corp. was not the injured non-
employee plaintiff in Ahlstrom, but rather the injured Salt Lake City's employee, Ms. 
Ross, whose was the tortfeasor in Ahlstrom. Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4, ,r 3, 153 
P.3d 179. 
23 
In the underlying case of Ahlstrom, the court examined the coming and going rule 
as it applies to Ms. Ross, an off-duty city police officer. Ultimately, the court held that 
Ms. Ross was not acting in the course and scope of her employment, thereby relieving 
Salt Lake City from being vicariously liable. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, if 18, 73 P.3d 315. 
As a result of the decision in Ahlstrom, Salt Lake City appealed the Labor Commission's 
decision to provide Workers' Compensation benefits to Ms. Ross for the accident, 
arguing that the coming and going rule also precluded Workers' Compensation benefits. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4, ilil 1-4, 153 P .3d 179. However, despite previously 
holding that Ms. Ross was not in the course of employment in relation to the third-party 
@ vicarious liability claim, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision to award 
Workers' Compensation benefits. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court explained the potentially 
apparent contradictory holding by reasoning that, as stated in subsection 11.B. l. above, 
"the application of the going and coming rule to a single event may result in treating a 
person as an employee for the purpose of establishing eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits while withholding employee status for the purpose of making the 
employer liable to third persons." Id. at if 4. As cited above, the Salt Lake City Corp. 
Court clearly recognized and set forth the different standards used in Workers' 
@ Compensation cases with vicarious liability cases. (See subsection II.B. l, supra.) 
The Salt Lake City Corp. Court made it clear that~ as contrasted to cases not 
involving potential Workers' Compensation claims, the Court's job is to "'look closely to 
@ assure ourselves that the Commission has liberally construed and applied the Act to 
provide coverage and has resolved any doubt respecting the right to compensation in 
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favor of an injured employee." Id. at , 18. And, "[ u ]nlike Ms. Ross' s quest for benefits, 
the Ahlstrom plaintift's were not entitled to a sympathetic application of the going and 
coming rule in aid of their effort to make Salt Lake City vicariously liable for Ms. Ross's 
negligence." Id. at, 17. 
As explained herein, Salt Lake City Corp. bolsters the District Court's decision to @ 
dismiss Appellant's claims, and further supports the distinction between applying stricter 
standards such as the Birkner test in respondeat superior cases, while applying the liberal 
standard provided by the Act, Soldier Creek, Hope, and any other cases addressing 
potential Workers' Compensation benefits and restrictions. 
C. Appellant's Hypotheticals are Answered by the Standard Set Forth in 
Hope and Soldier Creek. 
Appellant uses two hypotheticals to open her Argument, namely: Hypothetical #I, 
an employee is injured by a co-worker and both individuals were "clocked-in to work," 
and both were "performing work-related acts;" and Hypothetical #2, an employee is 
injured by a co-worker, however the injury occurred "a mile from their job," and "neither 
were performing any work-related acts." Appellant argues that the Act precludes a third-
party action in Hypothetical #I, while Hypothetical #2 is not governed by the Act. 
Appellant's assertions may be correct; however, neither of these hypotheticals analyze 
the facts that exist in this case, nor do they provide any additional insight to the propriety ® 
of applying Hope and the '"premises rule" to the facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have both acknowledged the existence of 
a clear boundary ,vith respect to whether an employee is covered under the Act when that 
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employee was injured on the employer's premises. Under the current and well-accepted 
application of Workers' Compensation analysis-as explained in the Act, Soldier Creek, 
and Hope-when an employee is injured by another employee while the employers are 
on their way to work, "the employer's property line provides a bright line test for 
application of the premises rule." Hope, 756 P.2d at 103 (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 
P .2d at 1167). This conclusion is "based on the logic that while the employee is on the 
employer's premises, his connection with employment is both 'physical and tangible."' 
Id. (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at 1167). As summarized by the Soldier Creek 
Court, "If the premises rule were distorted to cover this case, it would create a distinction 
@ difficult to justify and hard to apply in future cases." Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at I 167. 
Applying this clear, bright line of the universally accepted "premises rule" to 
Appellant's hypotheticals: the limited factual scenario in Hypothetical #1 would likely 
result in coverage under the Act, while the limited factual scenario in Hypothetical #2 
would likely preclude benefits under the Act. However, under either hypothetical, if a 
lawsuit ensued and benefits for either party under the Act were being claimed, the 
District Court would be required to analyze the parties' respective employment statuses 
under the liberal standard required for Workers' Compensation claims. See, e.g., Salt 
~ Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4, ~,l 17-18, 153 P.3d 179; Hope, 756 P.2d at 103; and 
Manning, 1999 UT 77, ~ 21, 985 P .2d 243. 
More importantly, setting hypotheticals and the assumptions, speculation, and 
@ factual holes that necessarily exist with such hypotheticals, aside, there are clear, 
undisputed facts in Appellan(s current claims. These facts, virtually identical to Hope, 
26 
clearly demonstrate as a matter of law, that at the time of the Accident, Appellant and 
Ms. Nelson were co-employees on their shared employer's premises, and their @ 
"connection with (their] employment [was] both 'physical and tangible."' See Hope, 756 
P.2d at 103 (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at 1167). 
III. THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTES PRECLUDING ct 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Lastly, whether Appellant was injured in the course of her employment, and 
therefore subject to the Act's exclusivity provision, is "a question of law." See, e.g., ii 
Drake v. Indus!. Com 'n of Utah, 904 P .2d 203, 205 (Utah App. 1995). 
Appellant argues that the District Court "made findings of fact on disputed issues 
of critically material fact[s]," and cites to the Appellate Record at 369.3 (See Appellant's 
Br., p. 18.) However, Appellant incorporates the substance of the District Court's 
"Findings of Facts" in her own statement of facts in her Brief before this Court. For 
example, the District Court noted that: "The accident occurred in the parking lot 
designated for employees of the IRS." (R. 373, ,r 9; see also R. 369, ,r 9.) By 
comparison, Appellant's statement of fact no. 3 states: "The building where Mrs. Brown 
worked had a designated parking lot for the employees." (See Appellant's Br., p. 3, ,r 3.) 
While Appellant expresses concern over the District Court's use of the term "designated" 
in regards to the Employee Parking Lot, Appellant chose to use the exact same term to 
3 Appellant cites to the unsigned Proposed Order granting Summary Judgement instead of 
the signed Order. Since the "Findings of Fact" in the Proposed Order at R. 369, and 
Findings of Fact in the signed Order at R. 3 73 are identical, Appellee presumes it was a 
simple mistake. 
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describe the Employee Parking Lot in her own statement of facts. ( Compare Appellant's 
® Br., p. 18, with Appellant's Br., p. 3, iI 3.) 
Appellant attempts to create an "issue of fact" by arguing over who actually 
"owned" the Employee Parking Lot. However, while an employer's ownership and/or 
control of real property would certainly be indicators of an employer's "premises," lack 
of title or control over real property is not a dispositive factor in analyzing the premises 
rule. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek, using property lines as a 
bright line test for application of the premises rule is "based on the logic that while the 
employee is on the employer's premises, his connection with employment is both 
<i 'physical and tangible."' Soldier Creek, 709 P .2d at 1167. Actual ownership or control 
of an employee parking lot does not change the "physical and tangible" connection of an 
employee and her place of employment. 
In fact, if lack of title or control of real property precluded an area of real property 
from being deemed as an employer's "premises" under the liberal application required 
under the Act, then since the IRS only leases the IRS Building where Appellant and Ms. 
Nelson work, no "premises" exists in which Appellant would be covered under Workers' 
Compensation. However, such rationale is not the standard for determining "premises." 
@ Notably, in Hope, there is no discussion of who actually owned or controlled the parking 
lot in which the accident took place, only that the parking lot and the building were ~'both 
located on the Defense Depot Odgen, Utah's facility," and that the parking lot was used 
@ by Defense Depot Ogden, Utah ~s employees. Hope, 756 P.2d I 02. 
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As testified by Appellant in her deposition, the undisputed facts of this case 
provide a clear boundary line for the IRS' s premises: for example, inter alia, the @ 
Employee Parking Lot was connected to the IRS Building; the entire premises was 
surrounded by a guarded fence with a single guarded entry; the only entrance and exit 
from the IRS Building was through the Employee Parking Lot; Appellant and Ms. Nelson ® 
were required to present employee identification prior to entering the Employee Parking 
Lot; employees were not permitted to bring weapons into the Employee Parking Lot; and 
employees used the Employee Parking Lot during fire drills. By Appellant's own 
testimony, the Employee Parking Lot and the IRS Building were both used by IRS 
employees in conjunction with their employment. (R. 102, 121-24, and 145-4 7.) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, as applied to clear Utah precedent and 
sound, well-accepted policy, and for the reasons more fully set forth above, Appellee @ 
respectfully requests that this Court apply the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity 
provision and affinn the District Court's dismissal of Appellant's negligence action 
against the estate of her coworker, Ms. Nelson, for the work-related Accident that 
occurred on her employer's premises. 
DATED May ~2016 
Respectfully Submitted. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
~~) 
~--,., CHARDK.GLAUSER 
DA VlD E. BROWN 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
May 9, 2012 
File Number: 12f )97 4 
nodpod-D-1 
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP PROGRAMS 
PO BOX 8300 DISTRICT 12 DEN 
LONDON, KY 40742-8300 
Phone: (303) 202-2500 
Date of Injury: 01/30/2012 
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN 
MARJORIE A BROWN 
1953 SOUTH 4700 WEST 
ROY, UT 84067 
Dear Ms. BROWN: 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
·-~· ., 
-. 
..;..·-
0 
N 
Your claim for compensation is denied because the evidence does not establish that you were 
injured in the performance of duty as required for coverage under the Federal Employees' 
Compensation Act (FECA). 
...... 
·-· 
On 02/21/2012 you filed a claim for Traumatic Injury indicating you sustained an injury or medical 
condition on 01/30/2012 as a result of your employment as a File Clerk with the Department of 
Treasury in Ogden, UT. Specifically, you stated that the Injury or condition occurred when you were 
hit by a car in the parking lot on your way to work. 
Along with your claim, we did not receive any additional Information with your claim. This was not 
sufficient because it does not support the factual element of your claim, ie. that injury occurred as 
alle~ed and It resulted In a medical diagnosls; it does not show that you were injured in the 
performance of duty; and it does include a physician's explanation of how the incident caused or 
aggravated the medical condition. 
On 03/01/2012 this office advised you of the deficiencies in your claim and provided you the 
opportunity to submit additional evidence. You were asked to' provide a narrative statement with 
further detail of what happened and to explain whether you were on agency premises, what assigned 
duties you were performing at the time or exadly what you were doing, if off premises where you 
were in relation to the agency premises, and indicate whether the parking lot is owned by the 
employer. You were also asked to submit a medical report with dates of examination and treatment, 
description of your symptoms, results of examinations and tests (including MRI and CT scans), 
diagnosis, clinical course of treatment provided, and the effect of such treatment, description of the 
specific employment duties/activities given by you to the physician, a physician's opinion supported 
by a medical explanation as to how work actiVitles In your Federal employment caused, contributed 
to, or aggravated your medical condition. You were provided 30 days to submit the requested 
information. 
In response to our development letter, we received the following evidence: authorization for 
examination CA-16 dated 2-7-12, a statement of incident dated--1~30-12, and hospital report dated 1- -
30-12, several physician assistant reports dated 3-7-12, and a treating report from Dr. Amann dated 
2-7-12 diagnosing you with pain in the neck/upper back and arm Dr. Amann opined your problems 
are stable. Dr. Amann describes that you were struck by a car and assessed shoulder pain and chest 
wall contusion. The hospital notes dated 01/30/2012 diagnosed a lumbar strain, acute cervical strain, 
and contusion: 
!';_!9l17l)(11/ 
File Number: 12f 197 4 
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In order for a claim to be accepted under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). the 
claim must meet 5 basic elements. The claim must: 
c 1 ) Be ttme1v €Ued; 
(2) Be made by a Federal,ClVU>Emplovee. 
(3) Establish'Fact ofliiluN. which has both a factual and medical component. Factually, the 
injury, accident or employment factor alleged must have actually occurred. Medically, a 
medical con~ition must bl;) _d!t:19nosed In connection with the injury or event. 
(4) Establish•Peffomiaoce':ofOutv. The injury and/or medical condition must have arisen 
during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors. 
(5) EstabllshJDausafRelationsh1Q; which means the medical evidence establishes that the 
diagnosed condition is causally related to the injury or event. 
You have established that you are a Federal civilian employee who filed a timely claim; that the 
injury, accident or employment factor occurred; and a medical condition has been diagnosed In 
connection with the injury or event. However, after a thorough review of all evidence, your claim for 
compensation is denied because the rourth basic element, Performance of Duty, has not been met. 
Under the FECA, an injury sustained by a plant employee, having fixed hours and place of work, 
whi!e going to or coming from work is generally not compensable because it does not occur in the 
performance of duty. However, exceptions to this rule have been declared and one such exception is 
the premises rule: an employeedrivjng to and from work is covered under workers' Compensation 
while on the premises of the e_mp(oyer. 1 
You failed to respond to the questions regarding the location of your injury, whether you were on 
agency premises, and specifically wha1 activity was being performed at the time. Therefore, there is 
insufficient information on record to determine whether you were in the performance of duty.2 
Based on these findings, your claim is denied on the fourth basic element, Performance of Duty, 
because the requirements have not been met for establishing that you sustained an injury and/or 
medical condition that arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable 
work factors as defined by the FECA. Medical treatment is.not authorized and prior authorization. if 
any, is terminated. 
-Your employing agency will charge any previously paid Continuation of Pay to your sick and/or 
annual leave balance or declare it an overpayment. 
If you disagree with this decision, you should carefully review the attached appeal rights, and pursue 
whichever avenue is appropriate to your situation. 
Sincerely, 
1t·cwwu4--tfvonne Canner 
Senior Claims Examiner 
1 HopeJ.Kahler(RogerA. Kahler), 39 ECAB_ .. (1988). 
2 Mere use of a parking facility, alone, is not sufficient to bring the parking rot within the "premises" of the 
emproying establishment. The premises doctrine is appl!ed where it is affirmatively shown that the employer 
owned, maintained, or controlled the parking facility, used the facility with the owner's special permission. or 
provided parking for its employees. Diane Bens miller, 48 ECAB _ (Docket No. 95-3108, issued September 
15, 1997). 
YC/dm 
Enclosure: Appeal Rights 
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DEi 'ARTMENT OF TREASURY 
FIie Number: 12r -0974 
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IRS-NATIONAL OFFICE (INCLUDES SERVICE CENTERS) 
IRS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CENTER 
400 NORTH 8TH STREET. BOX 7B 
RICHMOND, VA 23219 
. -. -- . . . . ~-- • - • .. -· • • a. • • • ..... • • - .. • •• • • - --- •• 
. . - . -----·- .. ---- - - ---- .. ------- -· ------- ·- . --- - ·-· -·- ·------
- . --
.@ 
Case Number: 12505C 
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN 
Date: May 9, 2012 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT APPEAL RIGHTS 
If you disagree With :ttie,~tta#lie,d 'd.e~i,fo~,_yClµ)have tll~;_rlgi)J to:request-a~ .1pp~I. If you:wist\, 
to req Liest a_rr a,ppea1! you tifiq~'jt':revl~wf~~~s:e:,p~·~a~}ig_~ts ca_reful Jy a 11.d ~ec:id~Wh ict.-a ppaal .. 
to reqµest.. The.te.-are:3ijiff.eteof:types9f,ppijal-a!1 otitUned.beli:>W, ¥.OU,MAY10,Nl;.Y . 
REQU.EST ONE~TVPE:O_F.APPEA;J;. A't'TffJ~fjlME. 
Piace::.tn;i.X;',c,n·tt,eatb_l'ched fr,ri:T.J·J_i'idf~;;t~ri'g~ljf¢1Hli>p~at·you_ are. r~qu~stlng. :cq,npJ_Elt~11te, 
inf.oini~tlon reqµe.siec1:,~~~~)~~1'.<>tf( qf'Jh'~J'.~~fW:, '.P,J~fo~illeJ~rm,op .~:OP :of ?O.YJn.~ti!ria.t ,you are 
•submlttlhg~.:·ntiti'rnaU'thehfd~·vitJh·~~~h~~f.its l9'the.,a~.:t'rtt.&~ 11~~(;1 fqr,_;t))~:;w.p@ pf ~pp&~). 
:that,- _iou,select.r :;Ahia s'!,vitlt!ifttie'it.i' a,oni. -·:e:ah':fSu1,areire 'uesiiil on;:the:outsitlts·dfihe Y . . . ·... }I. . .. , .. !l-.1:P,_ ... _ ... l?P.: )Y., ._._ .. _ q_ .· ... g . .. .... . . ........... . 
enveJo1:>e;(11HEA~l~G REQUl:f,T'\~R'l:C:QJ:,~1.DERATION REQUEST", or "ECAB REVIEW''), 
NOTE • If you have a substantially limiting physJc.il or,mental impairment, fed~tal disability 
nondlserl,ntnat1on law/gives you the righHo rec~lve, help-from,DFEC Ira the-form of 
communicat10111as~1starfoe, accommo#~tion and modification to atd you In the FECA claims 
process. For example,·we will provide you with copies of documents In alternate formats, 
communication services such as sign ranguage Interpretation, or other kinds of adjustments 
or changes to account for the limitations of your disability. Please contact the appropriate 
office below to ask about this assl5tance. · 
1. HEARi NG: If your Injury occurred on or after July 4, 1966, and you have not requested 
reconsideration, as described below, you may request a Hearing. To protect your right to a he~ti[Jg, 
any request for a hearing must be made before any request for reconsideration by the DistricfOffice'· 
(5 U.s.c_ 8124(b)(1)). Any hearing request must also be made in writing, within 30 calendar 
days after the date of this decision, as detennined by the postmark of your letter. (20 C.F.R. 
10.616). There are two forms of hearings, both conducted by a hearing representative. You may 
request either one or the other, but not both. 
a. Oral Hearing. An informaf orarhearing iseonducted at a location near your home or by 
teleconferenceMdeoconference; You may present oral testimony and written evidence in support of 
your claim. Any :person authorized by you in wriUng may represent you atan oral hearing. At the 
discretion of the hearing representative, an oral hearing may be conducted byteleconference or 
vldeoconference. 
b_ Review of the Written Record. You may submit additional written evidence, which must be sent 
with your request for review. You will not be asked to attend or give oral testimony. 
2. RECONSIDERATION: If you have additional evidence or legal argument that you believe wm 
establish your claim, you may request, in writing, that OWCP reconsider this decision. The request 
must be signed, dated and received within one caiendar year of the date of the decision. ft 
must clearly state the grounds upon which reconsideration is being requested, and be accompanied 
by relevant evidence not previously submitted, such as medical reports, sworn statements, or a legal 
argument not previously made, which apply directly to the issue addressed by this decision_ A person 
other than those who made this decision will reconsider your case. (20 C.F.R. 10.605-610) 
3. REVIEW BY THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD (ECAB): If you believe 
that all available evidence that would establish your claim has already been submitted, you have the 
right to req!Jest rt:,.vtew b.YJb~ -~QA~ (?O c._f,.g. JO.q2~)., The ECAB wHI review. only the evidence. 
received prior to the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. Part 501). Request for review by the ECAB 
must be made within 180 days from the date of this decfs1on. More information on the new Rules 
is available at www.dol.gov/ecab. 
no.,;7,';r.11, 
~, ·-" • • , • ... •y ' # 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
June 8, 2012 
BRADFORD DERBY 
ATTORNEY 
ROBERT J. DERBY AND ASSOC 
42~2 S 700E 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84107 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
File Number: 125' '974 
CA-1110-Q.. TH 
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP PROGRAMS 
PO BOX 8300 DISTRICT 12 DEN 
LONDON, KY 407 42-8300 
Phone: (303) 202-2500 
Date of Injury: 01/30/2012 
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN 
Th!s Is in response to your recent request for information . 
• As of 6/8/2012, disbursements as the result of this injury were reported as: 
Comp~nsatlon (pay) 
Compensation (medical) 
$ 0.00 
$ 5951.13 
Enclosed are printouts of the bill payment and compensation histories in the above-referenced case. 
If you have any questions, please contact me at the above address or call me at (303) 202-2500. 
Sincerely, 
J \.lt \ 7 l l~ltrlt[itt~ 
Customer Service Representative @ 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 
IRS-NATIONAL OFFICE (INCLUDES SERVICE CENTERS) @ 
IRS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CENTER 
400 NORTH 8TH STREET, BOX 78 
RICHMOND, VA 23219 
If you have a disability (a sub~tantially limiting physical or -~ental Impairment), please.contact our @ 
offlce/cfalms examiner for Information about the kinds of help available, such as communlccrtion 
assistance (altern&te formats or sign language fnfcrpretation), accommodations and modffidatihris} 7 / /. 8 1 ) 
@ 
ADDENDUM 
B 
... t 1t{ft~~t.itt~i, 
The Order of Court is stated below: ,l , '·{~'t 
Dated: May0l,2015 Isl EmieW.\ J.J 
09:06:08 AM Districf.'Co ' t 
'"'p; ' 
Michael J. Walk, Bar No. 6675 
Trystan Smith & Associates 
136 South Main Street Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 8410 I 
Telephone: (801) 257-7200 
Facsimile: (801) 257-7215 
Attorneys· for Defendant Alice Nelson 
Employees of the Corporate Law Depa1tment 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
-- ----· 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
--------- ---•--------·-· I 
' 
MARJORlE ANN BROWN, 
~J!-;~!°:'!~l~i'.}tf!~ 
Plaintiffs, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
V. 
THE ESTATE OF ALICE NELSON, Civil No. 130906495 
Judge Ernest Jones 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on February 25, 2015, for hearing on Defendant Estate 
of Alice Nelson's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment. J. Bradford Debry and Michael 
L. Banks appeared on behalf of plaintiff. J. Bradford Debry made arguments to the Comt. 
Michael J. Walk appeared on behalf of defendant and made arguments to the Cou11. Having 
reviewed the matter, including the briefs and submissions of the parties, the relevant case law, 
having heard argument from the parties, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby issues 
the following Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Court makes the following findings of undisputed material focts: 
I. Plaintiff Maijorie Brown (Plaintiff) was involved in an auto/pedestrian accident on 
@ 
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May 01, 2015 09:06 AM 1 of 4 
January 30, 2012 at approximately 4:55 am. 
2. Plaintiff had worked for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) since 2007. 
3. The IRS office where plaintiff worked is located at 1973 North Rulon White Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah. 
4. On the morning of January 30, 2012, plaintiff parked her car in the parking lot at 1973 
North Rulon White Boulevard, which was designated for IRS employees to park while at 
work. 
5. Plaintiff was walking through the parking lot to report to work when she was struck by a 
private vehicle driven by Alice Nelson. 
6. Defendant Alice Nelson worked for the IRS for approximately 14 years. 
7. Defendant worked at the IRS office located at 1973 N011h Rulon White Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah. 
8. Defendant was driving in the parking lot located at 1973 No11h Rulon White Boulevard, 
to park and report to work when the accident occmTed. 
9. The accident occuned in the parking lot designated for employees of the IRS. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
May 01, 2015 09:06 AM 
1. The case of Hope v. Berreu. 756 P.2d I 02 (Ut. App. 1988) is controlling law. 
Additionally, the Hope case is factually similar in all material respects to the facts 
of the instant case. 
2. Applying the ''premises rule~· as stated in Hope~ both plaintiff and defendant were 
on the employer's premises and in the course of their employment when this 
0373 
2 of 4 
that: 
accident occurred. 
3. Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury which was caused by a co-worker on the 
employer's parking lot which was designated for employees to park. 
4. Plaintiff is only entitled to pursue a workers' compensation claim pursuant to 
Utah statutes. 
5. Plaintiff cannot maintain a personal injury lawsuit against her co-employee, 
defendant Nelson. 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
2. Plaintiffs exclusive remedy was under the workers compensation statutes. 
3. Accordingly, all claims by plaintiff in the complaint against defendant are hereby 
DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the merits. This is a full and final order of this 
Court disposing of all issues alleged in the complaint. 
The Order of the Court is approved and dated as indicated above in the upper right-hand 
corner of this document with the Com1's Official Stamped Order and Date. 
Approved as to form: 
J. Bradford DeBry 
Michael L. Banks 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
May 01, 2015 09:06 AM 
0374 
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ADDENDUM 
C 
Utah Code 
34A-2-105 Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of employer. 
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and is the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, 
or any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because 
of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any 
accident, injury, or death of an employee. Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the 
employee's dependents, from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the client and the professional 
employer organization in a coemployment relationship regulated under Title 31A, Chapter 40, 
Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act. 
(3) 
(a) For purposes of this section: 
(i) "Temporary employee" means an individual who for temporary work assignment is: 
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing company; or 
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with a temporary staffing company. 
(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a company that engages in the assignment of 
individuals as temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill assignments with a finite 
ending date to another independent entity. 
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the payment of workers' compensation in 
accordance with Section 34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary staffing 
company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the temporary staffing 
company and the client company and its employees· and provide the temporary staffing 
company the same protection that a client company and its employees has under this section 
for the acts of any of the temporary staffing company's temporary employees on assignment 
at the client company worksite. 
Amended by Chapter 318, 2008 General Session 
Page 1 
ADDENDUM 
D 
In The Matter Of: 
Maijorie Ann Brown 
August 18, 2014 
Brown v. 
Nelson 
Q & A Reporting, Inc. 
1872 South Nlain Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
801.484.2929 
Original Fi le 08- l 8-14 - Brown Ma1jorie Ann_ I .lxt 
l\1in-U-Script® with Word Index • 
0116 
@) -
Brown v. 
Nelson 
Page 17 
1 it's too expensive on gas, so we have a little car now. 
2 Q. Okay. So it still works, it just--
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. -- would probably need to pass inspection so you 
5 need a new windshield --
6 
7 
8 
9 
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- and then, otherwise, it probably would work? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Marjorie Ann. Brown 
August 18, 2014 
Page 19 
A. Yes. 
Q. Unlike my building, you can't just walk into it, 
correct? 
A. No. You can't. 
Q. So -- and is that true both -- at every entrance 
to the building, there is -- is it a guard posted? 
A. There's only one entrance. 
Q. One entrance? 
A. Yes. And there is a guard. 
10 A. Very expensive on gas. 10 Q. So there may be other exits in case there are 
emergencies or something, there's probably some emergency 
exit? Or does everybody have to file out that one door? 
11 Q. Okay. By chance, do you know the address of 1l 
12 the -- of where you work? 12 
13 A. 1973 North Rulon White Boulevard. That's 13 A. There -- are you talking doors or gates to the 
parking lot? 14 R-0-L-U-O-N [sic] White Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. I don't 14 
15 know the ZIP code. 15 Q. Sorry. Let's start with the building itself. And 
16 I may not have been clear. 16 
17 
18 
19 
Q. Is there anybody else besides the IRS that works 
in that building? 
A. Just the security guards. 
Q. So -- and I just --
20 MR. BANKS: I'm just going to place an objection. 
21 Lacks foundation and form. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So, like, is there -- like, here in 
my building, you know, there's lawyers, there's architects, 
there's all kinds of people. Is there anybody besides the 
IRS? 
Page 18 
A. No. 
MR. BANKS: Same objection. Lacks foundation. 
Calls for speculation. 
4 
7 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So when you go to work-- and back 
s on that day, on the day of the accident, when you went to 
6 work, you parked in the -- is there a designated parking lot 
for you employees? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. It's - yeah. The whole thing -- area is a 
parking lot. 
Q. Yeah. And do other businesses park there? 
A. No. 
MR. BANKS: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So -- and let me ask you about 
14 that. So when you say "nobody else parks there," how do you 
15 know that? 
A. It's a federal - it's a federal building. It's 
17 
18 
A. Okay. 
Q. Thank you for helping me clarify that. 
19 But I want to ask you about the building itself. 
2 o Is there more than one entrance to the building? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And at each of those entrances to the 
23 building, is there a guard posted there? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Okay. Where there's not a guard posted there, are 
Page20 
l there -- is the door unlocked or is it locked? 
2 A. No. You have to scan your badge, and then it'll 
3 let you out, or scan your badge to get in. You have to have 
4 that Homeland Security badge to scan to let you in. 
5 
6 
7 
Q. Okay. 
A. On the entrance that has the guard, you can just 
walk in and then they have to look at your badge. 
8 
9 
Q. Okay. They look at your badge and that's where if 
someone were a visitor, ifl had business there, I could go 
10 there and I'd check in with the guard and he would give me a 
11 visitor pass or whatever? 
12 
13 
A. You'd have to get clearance first to get through 
the gate to come and be a visitor. 
Q. Okay. So let me ask you about that, when you talk 
15 about the gate. So there's a gate and a fence that 
surrounds the building? 
14 
16 16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
locked. It's a secure building. You have to have security 17 A. Yes. 
clearance to get on there. 
Q. To get on the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Just, like, to go into the building, you 
22 have to have your --
23 A. Homeland Security badge. 
24 Q. You've got to have your badge and credentials and 
25 whatever to get in, right? 
Min-U-Script® 801.484.2929 
18 Q. And there's only one entrance into the fenced 
19 area? 
20 A. Yes. There is another gate, but that is chained 
21 shut, and that is only used in case of -- if there was an 
22 emergency and everyone had to leave the parking lot, like a 
23 bomb threat. 
24 Q. Right. 
25 A. That would be then opened, but they would post a 
Q & A Reporting, Inc. 
Brown v. 
Nelson 
1 security guard there. 
2 Q. Yeah. To make sure nobody comes in~-
Page21 
3 A. In or out. And they would also check your badge 
4 going out. 
s Q. Okay. 
6 A. But I've never seen that unlocked, ever, 
7 
8 
9 
10 
l.1 
l.2 
l.3 
3.4 
unchained. 
Q. Do emergencies like that happen in your building? 
A. Occasionally. 
Q. Have you ever had to evacuate the building? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Other than maybe a drill, a fire drill 
or something like that? 
A. Yes. But we do not leave the parking lot. We 
is just go outside of the building. 
16 Q. But as far -- as long as you've been working 
Marjorie Ann Brown 
August 18, 2014 
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1 from you so you just can't get in at any time. 
2 Q. Okay. It's not like it goes inactive. They take 
3 it back and either reissue it or give you a new one? 
4 A. It'll go inactive, yes. They take it and then you 
5 . have to get it reactivated all over again -
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. - when you come back to work. 
8 Q. Do they ever discuss with -- I assume this would 
9 happen -- sorry, but I'm not sure -- do they ever discuss 
10 with you whether it would be wrong to just hop the fence? 
11 MR. BANKS: Objection. Form. Vague and 
12 ambiguous. 
13 Q. (By Mr. Walk) You know, have they ever -- and I'm 
14 just wondering, maybe if they send a memo or something and 
15 say, "Reminder, nobody should be climbing the fence." 
l.6 MR. BANKS: Same objection. 
1 7 there, you've never had an actual emergency where they've l. 7 
l. a made everybody evacuate the whole building and the parking 18 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Sorry. Go ahead. 
A. We have the security patrol the whole area, plus 
l.9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
lot? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So in order to get into the parking area, 
what do you have to do there? 
A. You have to pull up to the gate, and the security 
19 we have German Shepherds that have to - they also patrol. 
2 O Because they have to check every truck of mail that comes in 
21 for explosives, drugs. 
22 Q. Contraband? 
23 A. Right. Whatever. So, you know, you're -- when 
2 4 guard has to read your badge, make sure it's current, and 24 you're a new employee, of course you have that orientation 
2 5 then allow you in. 2 5 where, you know, you're not allowed to bring certain items 
Page 22 Page 24 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Q. Okay. ls there some sort of a bar or a gate or 
something that's closed until he lets it open, or is it just 
open, you just have to stop there? 
A. It's open and you have to stop. 
Q. Okay. I want to show you what I think is a 
6 photograph of what you described for me. I want to see if 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
that's correct. So is that the gate and --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- security area you were talking about? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay. For my reference, I'm going to attach that 
as Exhibit- I to your deposition. 
And so anybody who needs to get into that building 
-- well, sorry. Let me ask it this way, too: If someone --
1 saw that there were some bus slops near the area. 
A. Out here on the main road. 
Q. If someone were to drive -- ride the bus and get 
18 off, would you still have to walk through the security gate? 
19 A. Yes. You do. You have to still come to him or 
1 in. You cannot have any kind of weapons or anything like 
2 that. You can't- you wouldn't be able to get over that 
3 fence. It's too tall. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. But they drive -- the security drives trucks 
6 constantly. They have their trucks and they're continually 
7 on patrol. They go all the way around. 
8 Q. Patrolling the whole property? 
9 A. The whole - yes. 
10 Q. Okay. ls it your understanding, then, with the 
11 very -- it sounds like, and I want to make sure, if I'm not 
12 saying this correctly, please tell me -- but with a very 
13 rare exception, the only people in the building and getting 
into the parking lot are employees of the IRS? 14 
15 MR. BANKS: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
16 And leading. And lacks foundation. 
17 
18 
19 
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure. 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Do you know generally how many 
people work in that building at any one time? 
2 o her and they have to see your badge and he has to clarify 20 A. I do not. 
21 that it's --
22 Q. Still valid? 
23 A. -- still valid and let you in. 
21 
22 
23 
Q. Are there different shifts throughout the day? 
A. Just two. 
shift. 
There's a daytime shift and a nighttime 
24 Well, they tal,e your badge when it's no longer -- 24 Q. Okay. 
2 5 like, s;1y you're furloughed. They will hike your badge away 25 A. But the only time there's a -- they collapse the 
L ___ ·---------------------------~-------·· --------- -------·----··•-~--·----~ 
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1 nighttime shift when people are furloughed. When our season 
2 slacks off, then they will do what they say is collapse the 
3 nighttime shift and bring what few perms there are on nights 
4 up to days. And then when we get busy again, they'll start 
s the night shift again. And they'll take perms to be 
6 managers and such over the night group. 
7 Q. Okay. And generally, when is that - I know it's 
a not exactly, but when is the heavy season for you guys? 
9 A. It depends, because we have different forms. Our 
lO 1099s, which are quarterly returns, each have their own 
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l that is shown on any of those? 
2 
3 
A. Yes. Okay. The main entrance is right here. 
This is where we would go -- I was going in. 
4 Q. Okay. Will you do me a favor and just write kind 
5 ofon the building right there, "main." 
6 
7 
8 
MR. BANKS: Let's do this, can we mark these 
each --
MR. WALK: Sure. 
9 MR. BANKS: I don't think they're -- are they 
10 marked yet as 2 and 3, I, 2 and 3? 
11 peak. And then our main big peak is, of course, April 15th, ll 
12 but - and I'd say about two to three weeks prior to Apri1 12 
l.3 15th, and then it runs probably a good month aftenvards, if 13 
but--
MR. WALK: She hasn't put the sticker on yet, 
MR. BANKS: Can we put the stickers on them? 
MR. WALK: Sure. 14 not maybe a month and a half. l.4 
15 Q. Okay. Just for my information, so, did you know l.5 MR. BANKS: So we can keep track of them? 
MR. WALK: Sure. l.6 Alice Nelson? 16 
l.7 A. Is that the lady that hit me? 17 (Exhibit-I, Exhibit-2, and Exhibjt-3 were marked 
for identification.) 18 
19 
Q. Yeah. 18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Never had seen her before? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, you never worked with her in 
any capacity? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So do you recall when you entered that day, 
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1 do you remember where it was you parked? 
2 A. I always parked the same place when I used to 
3 drive. You can almost see it. It's, like, the second row. 
4 You have your visitor's parking right here, on the very end. 
5 Q. I'm going to show you a different one and see if 
6 we can --
7 A. Oh. 
8 Q. -- do this. This is exhibit -- so I've got a 
9 couple of them here, and I want to show them both because 
I'm not quite sure which one is applicable, and what -- so 
let me show you one which I'll mark as Exhibit-2 first. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
l.8 
19 
20 
21. 
And I think that is an overview of the whole 
parking lot -· 
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- and the building; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And I see kind ofup on the top comer sort 
of up there is the -- and I want to make sure that's correct 
-- I think that's the guard shack, right? 
A. Yes. 
19 
20 
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Okay. So I want you to -- on 
Exhibit-2 here, will you just write for me where the main 
21. entrance is. And that's where the sidewalk goes, right? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And it walks into the building. And that is the 
24 main entrance? 
25 A. Yes. 
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l Q. Is that generally where you would go when you 
2 would come to work? 
3 A. At that time, yes. 
4 Q. Do you remember at that time, back when this 
s accident happened in January 2012, did you ever use any 
6 other entrance to get into the building? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Okay. So generally -- and, well, and on that day 
9 of the accident, do you recall where it was you specifically 
10 parked? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. I always parked in this row right here. 
Q. So --
A. Depending on which area was - which spot was 
open, I would park right in this area. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So I could just come straight through there. 
Q. Okay. And so that's -- you've kind of marked that 
18 on Exhibit-2 with a rectangle and a line? 
19 
20 
21 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's generally the area you parked? 
A. Yes. 
22 
Q. Okay. Then -- and I'm not sure if -- I may not 
have got the right one, and we can -- I might be able to go 22 
23 grab another one, if that is not. So can you show me where, 2 3 
Q. Okay. On that date, did you park in that area? 
A. Yes. 
24 perhaps, if you remember, generally where you parked where 24 
25 -- if you do remember, exactly where you parked that day, if 25 
Q. And you may not remember the exact stall, but, 
again, it was that area? 
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l A. It was in that area. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Do you know, are there -- so you were 
3 saying at the time you may have worked -- sorry -- had a 
4 start time at either 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock? 
5 
6 
7 
B 
A. Six o'clock. 
Q. Do you know, does that -- are there different 
shifts that start still at those different times? 
A. Yes. Just at 5:00 to I :30, and - they have 5:00 
9 to 1 :30, 6:00 to 2:30, and there is a few that come to work 
at 7:00 to 3:30. 10 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. Very few. 
13 Q. Okay. So the main -- the bulk of the employees 
14 either come at 5:00 •· 
15 A. They come at 6:00. 
Q. -- or 6:00? The bulk come at 6:00. Okay. 16 
17 And that's -- so that's probably true, then, when 
18 you came -- if you.were coming at 5 o'clock that day, you 
19 generally had your pick of the parking spots? 
20 A. Well, yes, I would say. I'm not sure. I don't 
21 remember. But I know I parked in that area. 
22 Q. Okay. Do you remember the weather that day? 
23 A. It was very cold. My hair froze to the cement 
24 when my coffee spilled, so it was very cold. 
25 Q. Do you remember it snowing or --
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l A. No. 
2 Q. -- raining or anything, I mean, other than being a 
3 cold January morning? 
4 A. No. It wasn't snowing or raining, that I can 
5 recall. 
6 Q. Do you know if there was any snow left on the 
7 ground, or had it all been cleared and --
8 A. They keep the parking lot plowed. They have to. 
9 Q. Plowed. And do they also provide --
10 A. They salt. 
11 Q. They salt it? 
12 A. They do. 
13 Q. Okay. So unless it's snowing, generally, the 
14 parking lot is well kept up? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And you don't remember there being any snow on the 
17 ground or a concern that morning al all? 
18 A. No, I don't. 
19 Q. Okay. And so after parking your car -- sorry. I 
20 don't know that it maltcrs, but when you park your car, do 
21 you generally pull straight into the stall or some people --
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. -- tum around and back in? 
24 A. No. I pull in. 
25 Q. You don't do that. You pull in. Okay. 
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l Were there any issues that you remember parking 
2 that morning? · 
3 A. No. Ordinary morning. 
4 Q. Yeah. Okay. 
5 So then can you explain to me, just describe for 
6 me, when you got out of your car, from there until when the 
7 accident happened, what happened? What do you remember? 
8 A. I got out of my car. I stopped here to check and 
9 make sure there's nothing coming. 
10 Q. When you say "stopped here," where is that? Would 
11 you describe that? 
12 A. This is where the cars go in between the parking 
13 - this is the driving lanes, I would say. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. And I crossed the driving lane when it was clear. 
16 I came to -· I came through the parking areas here -- to the 
17 driving lane that's right in front of the building. 
1a Q. Okay. 
19 A. I stopped. A car was turning down here at the 
20 very end by the visitor's parking. That's these stalls 
21 right there (witness indicating). 
22 Q. Will you write for me, will you write "visitor" 
23 across those so that we know -- yeah. 
24 A. I was right here in front of the main crossing 
25 area. 
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l Q. Okay. 
2 A. The headlights had just turned down the road by 
3 the visitor's. I proceeded to walk across here. The 
4 headlights -- I didn't - I stopped looking because I 
5 thought I had - l would have had plenty of time. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. I started walking across. I turned. The 
8 headlights were right on top of me. I can still see it. 
9 All I had time to think was, "I'm going to get hit." And 
10 then I got hit. 
11 Q. Okay. So I want to -- see, is this -- this is a 
12 little bit --
13 A. Bigger. 
14 Q. -- closer picture of where you were describing, 
15 right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 MR. BANKS: Arc you talking about Exhibit-3? 
18 Q. (By Mr. Walk) Yeah. So -- and let me ask -- hang 
19 on, before you do that. So do you remember when you walked 
20 through that last row of parking stalls --
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. -- I see that there is a part in between some of 
23 the handicap srnlls that has lines --
24 A. That's the walkway. 
25 Q. Yeah. And that's generally where people walk? 
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